Normative Analysis Comprehensive Exam

For the Normative Exam, you are given two mandatory questions, and then five specialty questions, of which you choose two. Here are the questions I answered:

1.Rawls’s work on justice, from A Theory of Justice to Public Reason Revisited tries to deal with the core concerns of distributive justice, ranging from equality to freedom to democratic law. In it he tries to answer questions such as: equality with regard to what? freedom to do what? freedom from what? and why care about democratic law? Describe Rawls’s answers to those four questions. Then describe the answers of two other authors  you have read who criticize Rawls. They need not criticize Rawls on all four questions, so feel free to focus only on the questions on which they focus. Say who has the better of the debate, in your opinion. And say why. Use examples if it will help to clarify your point, but do not get caught up in lengthy discussion of examples; keep your focus on the theory.

[For this answer, I talked about Rawls two principles: “(1)Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others, and (2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” Then I explained how Rawls aims to use deliberative democracy as a way of having reasonable debate, given that people have different political conceptions of justice. They can all agree that democratic laws are legitimate, even if they don't agree with the outcome. I talked about the feminist criticism of Rawls provided by Susin Okin - that he should (but doesn't) include the family in the "basic structure" of society, and that his two principles should apply to the family. I also talked about the criticism of Amartya Sen, who argues that Rawls list of "primary goods" are not sufficient, and that we should focus on increasing the "freedoms" of a person to do various things, rather than on the goods that they have.

2.Consider the case of Bob, who has lived like a church mouse for 10 years, working 80 hours a week as a nurse, saving his money to buy his dream car: which, because he is so ecologically oriented, is now a Tesla Roadster (100% electric). He takes it for a spin down by the trolley tracks and parks it on an obviously unused spur. He goes for a walk along the tracks and to his shock and horror he sees a trolley hurtling, clearly out of control, at 5 workmen straight ahead on the tracks. He also sees that a switch lies nearby and he realizes that if he pulls it, the trolley will be diverted on the spur. He immediately sees that this is the only way to save the five, but that doing so will destroy his brand new Tesla, his pride and joy (the people on board the trolley, he reasons, will survive the impact). His insurance company, however, is very unlikely to cover him for the act of turning a trolley onto his car, no matter how altruistic an act that is. So there it is: save five, or lose his beloved car.

May Bob morally (forget the law for the moment) choose not to sacrifice his Tesla for the five workmen? Keep in mind how much he sacrificed—he lived like a church mouse for 10 years—to get the car. How does this compare to our own decisions to live lives of relative luxury—going out to dinner, buying nice clothes, taking nice vacations—when we could choose to live more like church mice and use our extra earnings to save people in poor parts of the world who will otherwise starve to death or die of preventable diseases? Assume that your dollars of aid would be well spent saving lives, i.e. that your sacrifice would be almost as effective (inevitable administrative costs notwithstanding) as would Bob’s sacrifice of his car if he turns the trolley onto it. Consider these questions from a utilitarian, a deontological, and a virtue ethics point of view. Which do you agree with, and why? Finally, what sort of policy—in terms of requiring sacrifice in Bob-type situations, and in terms of taxing and using that money to help others in other countries—would you recommend and why?

[For this question, I basically went through a utilitarian argument and through many deontological arguments to analyze what they might say. I argued that utilitarians would almost surely argue that he could not morally choose not to sacrifice his car. Some of the deontologists however, emphasize distinctions such as "doing vs. allowing" which might say, for example, that since (by not pulling the switch) Bob is simply allowing the workmen to be killed, it's actually ok. Virtue ethics focuses on what actions would be "admirable," so I think it's clear in this case that it wouldn't be considered "admirale" to save the car rather than the workmen. I agreed with the utilitarians and the virtue ethicists. Bob has a moral obligation to save the workmen, regardless of how much he loves (and worked hard for) his car. When applying the issue to giving money to the poor, I drew on Peter Singer (who gives almost this exact scenario in his book, One World), who argues that the this scenario is exactly the same as giving money to charity - it's a very easy way to save people's lives, and by valuing your luxury goods more than saving lives, you're as bad as Bob. I went through the utilitarian, deontological, and virtue ethics arguments for this scenario, and argued again that there is a moral obligation to give to charity, however, the question is to what degree this must be done (i.e. do you give all of your money to charity until you're also in poverty?)]

5.Consider the following hypothetical scenario:
Jada works for a private firm that contracts services to the US Central Intelligence Agency.  Her background is in image analysis, and so she has been assigned to a team that operates armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or “drones”) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.  Jada does not “pull the trigger,” but she is directly involved in targeting decisions by confirming the identity of possible targets.  She knows that, in many cases, confirming that someone seen by a UAV is who the CIA believes he or she is will lead to that person being killed in a missile strike.


Last week, a truck bomb was detonated outside Jada's home in a Northern VA suburb.  She was killed, along with her partner, their children, and fifteen other bystanders.


Though the immediate perpetrators were killed in the attack, US intelligence services have identified a group of Pakistani citizens in the US to whom they can tie to the attack with a high degree of probability. A tape was also released to Al-Jazeera, taking credit for the attacks on behalf of the Pakistani Taliban and further claiming that:

• Jada was an active combatant and a legitimate military target because of her involvement with UAV attacks;
• The harm to noncombatants was regrettable, but justified given the importance of the military end. In particular, the tape favorably compares the deaths to the numbers of noncombatants killed by Israeli operations.
• By not providing Jada and similar employees with military barracks separate from the civilian population, and not  informing civilians that combatants were being housed among them, the US was in violation of its legal (Geneva Convention I, Art. 51) and moral obligation not to use "civilian shields.”
• The message closed with (i) a demand that anyone involved be treated as lawful combatants and given full protection as prisoners of war if captured, and (ii) a promise of future attacks.
• As you discuss the following issues, focus primarily on the moral rather than legal considerations – information on international law is provided only to help define some common categories and to provide guidance where you believe following the law may have inherent moral value.
• How, if at all, should the US act on the intelligence it possesses regarding the bombers' accomplices? In particular, what means may be used to kill, capture, or extract information from them, and what procedural protections (e.g., a trial) should they enjoy? Did they act immorally in plotting with the bombers to kill Jada, and if so, in what way? Under international law, prisoners of war need not be tried, but are to be released at the end of hostilities, and may not be coerced into providing any information; unlawful combatants enjoy some protections under law (notably, a ban on torture) but not such strict ones.
• How, if at all, should the US change its policies in the future about who may be involved in directing drone attacks, and how they should be treated? Consider at least three categories: privately employed individuals, civilians who “pull the trigger” on UAV attacks (e.g., CIA), and uniformed military.

[For this question, I talked about Walzer's Just War Theory. I also drew on David Luban's discussion of how the laws of war and the laws of criminal justice had gotten mixed up in the War on Terror, so that 'enemy combatants' are treated partially as normal criminals, but partially as enemy soldiers (e.g. they can be taken without having actually acted yet like soldiers, but they don't get POW status). I argued that in this case, the men should probably be treated as criminals, rather than enemy soldiers, but that this would mean they should get a trial. I argued that they did act immorally in killing Jada, but that in the future, it is important for countries to make clear who is involved in combat and who isn't. Analyzing UAV or satellite data is not combat (I think), but flying a UAV and carrying out attacks is.]

6.Sen makes the following claim: “Developing and strengthening a democratic system is an essential component of the process of development.” What does Sen mean by “democracy” and by “the process of development” and how do Sen’s conceptions compare with alternative definitions? Clarify and assess the arguments that Sen employs to justify his claim? Now state and evaluate what you take to be the best argument for the conclusion that democracy is at best unnecessary and at worst an obstacle for development? Given this controversy do you think that a development agency, such as USAID or the World Bank, should promote democracy? In what sense and why or why not?

[For this question, I mostly used Sen's book "Development as Freedom." I argued that Sen sees democracy as a set of political and liberal rights for individuals as well as opportunities. I said that he sees the process of development as the increase of freedoms and capabilities for individuals, while others may consider development as simply an increase in GDP or per-capita income. I talked about the "Lee Thesis" that says democracy isn't necessary for development, based on the experience of Korea and China. However, I said that this doesn't prove that democracy isn't helpful. I personally agree with Sen's argument that democracy is both instrumental and intrinsically important to development. Based on this, I said that democracy (civil and political freedoms in particular) should be promoted.]

The State of Democratic Theory: Deliberation against Domination?

The State of Democratic Theory

Chapter 2: Deliberation against Domination?

By Ian Shapiro

Shapiro suggests that deliberation can play a role in decreasing domination. He suggests that those with insiders’ wisdom are best able to judge how deliberation can help enhance an activity. However, he argues that the government should give increased deliberative power (power of delay, appeal, or veto) to those whose basic interests are at risk. The government should put in place institutional devices that seek to force deliberation as an intermediate form of regulation between proscriptive intervention and full deference to insiders’ wisdom.

Introduction

Shapiro begins the chapter 2 by asking how should we think about the appropriate role of deliberation in promoting the common good? First, we define common good as that “which those with an interest in avoiding domination share.” Then, the question of whether deliberation promotes the common good is reframed as the question of whether it diminishes domination. The challenge is to figure out ways to manage the power dimensions of human interactions to limit domination while also minimizing interference with the non-power dimensions of human interaction. He argues that deliberation can help in this situation.

Deliberation can be misused by the powerful to procrastinate. It is also possible that institutional methods of promoting deliberation might just lead to bargaining. Shapiro aims to deal with this by limiting the right to demand increased deliberation to those who are vulnerable in a given situation because their basic interests are at stake.

2.1 Thinking about Power

Some in the power literature argue that power trumps institutional arrangements, so studying institutions is uninteresting. Others focus on defining the three faces of power: decision-making, agenda-setting, and repressing preferences that would otherwise be expressed and acted on. These studies do not explain the institutional implications of their theories – i.e. they don’t explain how decisions should be made, how agenda setting power should figure into the debates about institutional reform, or how quiescence should be dealt with when it is identified.

There are also Foucauldian points of view that argue power relations are ubiquitous and ineliminable, but this also doesn’t help to choose among institutional possibilities. Clarissa Hayward makes case that domination is minimized to the degree that freedom is enhanced, where this is understood as enabling people to shape their own fields of possible action. She suggests that political institutions should be structured such that their effects on other social practices and institutions are freedom promoters, but she doesn’t say how this is to be achieved.

Power relations suffuse contexts as various as workplace, family, and church, but things other than exercises of power also go on in these areas. The challenge for democratic theorists in this area is to devise mechanisms for structuring the power dimensions of human interaction so as to minimize domination while limiting interference with these other activities as much as possible.

2.2 Insiders’ Wisdom and Superordinate Goods

The benefits of deliberation are not unequivocal; deliberation can sometimes create costs that outstrip its advantages. It is possible that third parties (such as the government) may not know how much and what sorts of deliberation will enhance other activities. For example, if increasing some types of deliberation could make firms more efficient, it seems likely that those in the firm would be best at identifying these opportunities. If deliberation would make a sports team better, those on the team would have incentive to identify and engage in these activities to ensure that they win. These examples suggest that there is insiders’ wisdom: those skilled in a particular activity are more likely than anyone else to know how to do it well (or to know how much and what sorts of deliberation will enhance it).

It’s possible that economic efficiency and winning at sports are misleading examples. Consider, instead, evaluating scholarship in the context of tenure promotions at universities. These decisions are based on judgments rather than objective criteria. Still, there is no reason to think that the government would be better at making these judgments than those within the university.

It is possible that insiders could be wrong about how to enhance an activity. Managers in a firm may undermine the interests of shareholders or make short term decisions. It is important to distinguish arguments for intervention designed to protect the interests of vulnerable employees from arguments that assume outsiders know how to run firms efficiently.

In a traditional democracy, the people are supposed to govern themselves. However, modern democracy uses a division of labor. In this system there are insiders who are expected to have expert competence. For example, outsiders should not be able to tell the Supreme Court justices when or how long to deliberate, and they should not be allowed to adjust the rules of the House and Senate. However, governing does differ from running firms, families and other endeavors. A substantial part of the super-ordinate good involved is the exercise of legitimate power in a given territory or domain. This warrants control of politicians via democratic competition for power.

Some suggest that government should institute increased deliberation among citizens because it is inherently (rather than instrumentally) valuable. Hegal suggested that we only become truly human in justifying ourselves to one another. This is one credible view of the human condition, to be sure, but there are others, and it is difficult to see why it should be privileged over those other views. People should be free to deliberate, but should not be forced to do so. However, it should also be ensured that people with an intense preference for deliberation don’t exert disproportionate influence on outcomes by monopolizing control of agendas.

2.3 Limiting Domination Through Deliberation

Decisions about how to pursue superordinate goods are best left to those with insiders’ wisdom, but their freedom to make them should not be unfettered. Because superordinate goods are bound up in power relations, the government must regulate their pursuit to limit the possibility of domination.

The right to deliberative participation should vary with the degree to which people are trapped. As the costs of exit increase, the importance of voice also increases. For example, if a stockholder is unhappy with a firm, she can sell her shares. An unhappy employee of the firm doesn’t have the same freedom of action, so the employee has a stronger claim to deliberative participation. When the affected party cannot participate in decision-making (they have no voice), then others should insist on significant deliberation. This is the case with juries in criminal cases and with decisions on ending life support for the terminally ill.

When exit costs are low for everyone, there is no reason to require deliberation: by definition the interests at stake are not hostage to the decision. No deliberation is required if exit costs are high for everyone and the interests at stake are all the same. For example, an ex ante veil-of-ignorance decision by a healthy population about how to ration future organ transplants would provide all people with high exit costs and equal interests at stake.

The kind of interest at stake (not just the costs) need to be taken into consideration when deciding whether or not deliberation is appropriate. For example, South Africa’s white minority stood to lose more than nonwhites, but they should not have been entitled to rights of delay or appeal.

The right to deliberation, including delay, appeal, or veto, should be activated when basic interests are at stake. Basic interests include obvious essentials they need to develop into and survive as independent agents – similar to lists provided by Rawls, Dworkin, and Sen. Anyone in a position to threaten a person’s basic interest evidently has great power over him. An employer may have high exit costs (stocks, etc.) for leaving company, but we assume their basic interests are not involved. An employee is more likely to have his basic interests at stake. This type of consideration led to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which allowed labor unions to form.

Government regulation can create varying amounts of “voice.” For example, some regulations give citizens the right to challenge unfair leases in court. As a normative matter, we can say that the more one’s basic interests are threatened, the stronger one’s claim is to insist on deliberation, but that beyond some threat threshold even this is insufficient.

Generally, we can think of institutional devices that seek to force deliberation as an intermediate form of regulation between proscriptive intervention and full deference to insiders’ wisdom. In this spirit, we might replace proscription voucher schemes in education with a solution in which parents that do not opt out of public schools are given a delay, appeal, or maybe veto rights if the promised benefits of their children’s education do not in fact take place. In this case, those promoting vouchers would need to convince these parents to allow the program. The government would decide how strong to make the deliberative rights of the non-participating parents, but would not just proscribe vouchers. This solution recognizes the cognitive limitations of government without abdicating their responsibility to regulate the power dimensions of social life to limit the possibility of domination.

In general, rather than having the government evaluate the merits of innovative funding schemes, it could use its power to make those who advocate them persuade those whose basic interests are plausibly at stake. Strengthening the hand of the vulnerable in this way is intended to encourage the search for cooperative solutions when interests conflict.

Petit suggests extending strong “contestatory” rights to all minorities in democratic systems, in an effort to move us closer to a world in which “what touches all” will be “considered and approved by all.” However, unless we limit the rights of delay to those whose basic rights are threatened, we privilege the status quo.

2.4 Deliberations versus Bargaining

Some may argue that Shapiro’s proposal that government should strengthen the hand of weaker parties whose basic interests are threatened is sufficient to guarantee more equal bargaining, perhaps, but not deliberation. Shapiro acknowledges that this may be true. Since deliberation requires solicitous goodwill, creative ingenuity, and a desire to get to the best answer, it is doubtful that government can ever insist that people deliberate. Even juries can’t be forced to deliberate if they decide to bargain instead (because they want to go home, etc.) However, government can increase the likelihood that insiders will deploy their wisdom to search for the deliberative solutions that may be waiting to be discovered. And though it is true that bargaining may sometimes be inferior to deliberation, but domination is always inferior to both

The Idea of Public Reason Revisited by John Rawls

The Idea of Public Reason Revisited

By John Rawls

The idea of public reason deals with the way citizens should debate with each other in a well-ordered constitutional democratic society. It is important that citizens make arguments only based on public reason coming from a political conception of justice. The public reasons should only include arguments that other citizens could reasonably be expected to accept – they should follow the principle of reciprocity.

Introduction

The idea of public reason is part of Rawls conception of a well-ordered constitutional democratic society. Public reasons helps to define the form and content that citizens should use to debate with one another. Rawls argues that public reason is necessary because any democratic society will have reasonable pluralism (multiple conflicting religious and moral comprehensive philosophies). Public reason doesn’t criticize or attack any comprehensive doctrine, unless it’s incompatible with the essentials of public reason – i.e it doesn’t accept a democratic regime and legitimate law.

1. The Idea of Public Reason

1.1 Public reason identifies the basic moral and political values that determine a constitutional government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. It doesn’t try to define the whole (comprehensive) truth, but only a political conception. The idea of public reasons has five aspects that make up its structure: 1) the fundamental political questions to which it applies, 2) the person to whom it applies (government officials and political candidates), 3) the contents, which are found in political conceptions of justice, 4) the application of these conceptions in discussions about legitimate law, and 4) citizens ensuring that the principles of the conceptions of justice satisfy the criterion on reciprocity.

Public reason is public because 1) it is the reason of the public (fee and equal citizens), 2) it is used to think about questions regarding the public good, including constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, and 3) it has a nature and content that are public, since it is made up of political conceptions that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.

Public reason only applies to questions in the public forum. This can include the discussion of judges in making their decisions (especially in the supreme court), the discussions of government officials (especially the president and congressmen), and the discussion of candidates running for public office (particularly in their public statements and party platforms). The idea of public reason doesn’t apply to the background culture or to the media.

The ideal of reason occurs when judges, legislators, and others explain their reasons for a decision in terms of a political conception of justice. Citizens can use public reason by thinking of themselves as if they were legislators and asking what statutes they would support and for what reasons.

1.2 The fundamental political relation of citizenship has two basic features:

(1) It is a relation of citizens within the basic structure of society, entered only by birth, exited by death.

(2) It is a relation of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body.

Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation, according what they consider to be the most reasonable conception of justice. Citizens will differ as to which conceptions of political justice they think most reasonable, but they will agree that all are reasonable, even if barely so. When deciding on a matter of basic justice, if everyone acts from public reason, then the opinion of the majority is legitimate law, and morally binding on him or her as a citizen.

Political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity says: Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons. The criterion of reciprocity is usually violated when basic liberties are denied (religious liberty, slavery, women’s suffrage, etc.).

People who insist that fundamental questions should be answered by their own idea of the whole truth (including their comprehensive doctrine) instead of reasons that might be shared by everyone, will reject the idea of public reason.

1.3 The focus of public reason is on a well-ordered constitutional democracy (deliberative democracy). In a deliberative democracy, there are three essential elements, 1) the idea of public reason must exist, 2) the democratic institutions must create a framework for deliberative legislative bodies, and 3) the citizens must be able to understand and use public reason and be able to realize it in their political conduct.

The immediate implications of these elements are: public financing of elections and providing for public occasions for serious discussion of issues of public policy. If this wasn’t done, politics would be dominated by corporate or other interests who could distort political outcomes by giving large contributions. The constant pursuit of money makes the political system unable to function. It is important that citizens be informed about the basic aspects of government and about pressing problems.

2. The Content of Public Reason

2.1 A citizen engages in public reasons when he deliberates using a reasonable political conception of justice. The political conception must express political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse. The content of public reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice (Justice as Fairness is just one of many). However, all of them must include the criterion of reciprocity

Each of these conceptions endorses the underlying idea of citizens as free and equal persons and of society as fair system of cooperation over time. They all include protection of basic rights, such as religious liberties and freedoms. However, each may use different formulations and different rankings of political principles. It’s important that there are always a variety of permissible forms of public reasons to ensure that ideas arising from social change are not repressed.

2.2 Public reason does not simply mean secular reason. Comprehensive secular doctrines (like comprehensive religious doctrines) are too broad for public reason. Political conceptions should have three features: 1) their principles apply to the basic structure of society, 2) they can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of any kind (though there may be overlapping consensus with comprehensive doctrines), and 3) they can be developed using fundamental ideas that are implicitly in the public political culture of a constitutional regime (citizens are free and equal persons, society is a system of fair cooperation, etc.).

Public reason requires using a political conception to debate. However, Rawls proviso states that this requirement still allows us to introduce into political discussion our comprehensive doctrine, provided that we give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.

2.3 A political conception must be completely defined – you cannot simple proceed from a comprehensive doctrine to several political principles and particular institutions. A full political conception must express principles, standards, ideals, and guidelines for inquiry. It must be able to give a reasonable answer to all or nearly all questions about basic justice. Finally, the ordering of principles must be reasonable via political reasoning.

2.4 Rawls provides a few examples to illustrate the content of public reason compared to moral reason.

Example 1 Autonomy: Political autonomy includes the legal independence and integrity of citizens who are able to share equally in the exercise of political power. Moral autonomy promotes a particular way of life (Mill’s idea of individuality).

Example 2 The Good Samaritan: Public political culture allows us to use the Gospel story, but public reason requires that we justify our proposal in terms of political values.

Example 3 Desert in fair distribution of income: A political conception of fair distribution of income might argue that persons in various offices should have the requisite qualifications and should have fair opportunities to quality themselves for these positions. A moral conception of fair distribution of income might argue that goods should be distributed in accordance with moral desert or moral worth of character.

Example 4 State’s interest in the family and human life: A political conception recognizes the need for the state to perpetuate itself leads to need to regulate the family (in a form that is just), provide arrangements for rearing and educating children, and provide institutions for public health. A moral conception might propose that the state should enforce monogamy or prevent same-sex marriages because of religious or other reasons.

2.5 It is important to remember that secular comprehensive doctrines are not allowed – the same way that philosophical and religious comprehensive doctrines are not allowed. These fall outside the domain of the political. This can be seen if we consider what each type of doctrine might ask with regard to making homosexual relations among citizens a criminal offense. A secular doctrine might ask, “Is it precluded by a worthy idea of the full human good?” A religious doctrine might ask, “Is it a sin?” A political conception would ask, “Will legislative statues forbidding those relations infringe on the civil rights of free and equal democratic citizens?”

3. Religion and Public Reason in Democracy

3.1 How is it possible for a citizen of faith to support a democratic society in which their comprehensive doctrine may not prosper? We can consider the example of Catholics and Protestants in the 16th and 17th century. They tolerated each other, but if either could have gained control, they would have imposed their comprehensive doctrine on everyone. This type of situation might lead to a similar system to the one we have – it would involve a constitution to protect religious liberty and would require debate in political terms to avoid open religious conflict. However, the stability would exist for the wrong reasons – it would not be secured by a firm allegiance to society’s political ideals.

Instead, in a well-ordered society, while no one is expected to put his or her religious or non-religious doctrine is in danger, they must give up forever the hope of changing the constitutions so as to establish their religions’ hegemony, or qualifying or obligations so as to ensure its influence and success.

3.2 This is possible if religious doctrines understand and accept that, unless they endorse a reasonable constitutional democracy, there is no other fair way to ensure the liberty of its adherents consistent with the equal liberties of other reasonable free and equal citizens. Our political conception requires that we protect religious liberty of all citizens.

4. The Wide View of Public Political Culture

4.1 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines (religious or nonreligious) may be introduced into public political discussion provided that in due course, proper political reasons are presented to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support (the proviso). We can acknowledge that there may be positive reasons for introducing comprehensive doctrines into public political discussion, however, the details of satisfying the proviso must be worked out in practice, not in advance.

4.2 Citizen’s knowledge of each others’ religious and non-religious doctrines is important, because they recognize that the roots of democratic citizens’ allegiance to their political conceptions lie in their respective comprehensive doctrines. Mutual knowledge about citizens’ comprehensive doctrines provides a positive ground for introducing and discussing those doctrines. When considering an issue such as abolition or civil rights, all sides should introduce their comprehensive doctrines as a way to explain how these doctrines support basic political values (which are also supported by reasonable conceptions of political justice).

4.3 Public reasoning aims for public justification. The goal is to argue from premises that we accept and that we think others could reasonably accept. In doing so, we should declare our own comprehensive doctrine, though we do not expect others to share it. We can show how our comprehensive doctrine leads us to endorse a reasonable political conception. For example, we might cite the story of the Good Samaritan and then go on to give a public justification of the parapble’s conclusions based on political values. We can also use this kind of reasoning to conjecture about how other people’s comprehensive doctrine could be used by them to support a reasonable political conception.

5. On the Family as Part of the Basic Structure

5.1 The family is part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from one generation to the next. Reproductive labor is socially necessary labor. The central role of the family is to arrange in a reasonable and effective way the raising and caring for children. Within a family, the elders have a certain moral and social authority.

5.2 In order for public reason to apply to the family, it must be seen as a matter for political justice. This is the case, because political justice is concerned with the basic structure of society. It is necessary to apply the principles of justice to the internal life of families, otherwise we cannot ensure equal justice for wives along with their husbands.

The argument that political justice should apply to the internal workings of groups, not just to societies structure, could be applied to all associations - churches, universities, etc. However, we don’t require that Bishops be elected or that the church hierarchy satisfies the difference principle. Not all of the liberal principles of justice need to apply. However, we do impose some essential constrains. For example, the public law does not recognize heresy or apostasy as crimes, so members are always free to leave their faith. Similarly, not all political principles apply directly to internal family life, but they do impose constraints on the family as an institution. All members of the family are guaranteed basic rights and liberties, freedoms, and opportunities. The appropriate constraints may vary depending on the nature of the group or association. As citizens we must impose constraints on associations based on political principles of justice. But as members of associations we aim to limit those constraints to leave room for a free and flourishing internal life appropriate to the association in question.

6. Questions about Public Reason

6.1 Some might argue that the idea of public reason would limit the topics that are available for political debate.

For example, some people might believe that public reason tries to settle political reasons in advance, such as in the case of prayer in schools. However, we can see that when Patrick Henry argued for establishing the Anglican Church for Virginia, he argued that Christian knowledge would correct the morals of men, restrain vices, and help preserve the peace of society. He argued using political values (peace in society, etc.), not by saying that Christian knowledge was intrinsically good. Madison rebutted this argument by saying that the religious establishment wasn’t necessary for ensuring an orderly society. This example shows that public reason is not about a specific set of political institutions or policies, it is about the types of reasons that citizens can use when making political cases. The reasons for separation of church and state should be based on principles that can be affirmed by all free and equal citizens, given reasonable pluralism. This law protects religion from the state and the state from religion. No religion has to fear being outlawed, or having another religion be officially endorsed.

Some people may think that public reason will lead to a stand-off and will fail to bring decisions. However, this can happen in all forms of reasoning, including science and common sense. In the case of stalemate, a reasonable process must be endorsed. For example, if a judge thinks the legal arguments are balanced on both sides, he can’t just appeal to his own personal political values. For citizens, this is the same – if a decision can’t be made based on public reason, they can’t simply fall back on their comprehensive views – this would fail to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.

For example, the issue of abortion is one that may lead to stand-off between different political conceptions. In this case, citizens must vote according to their complete ordering of political values. However, reasonable political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion – we should not expect unanimity of views. However, the outcome of the vote is legitimate as long as everyone uses public reason, and voting occurs within a constitutional regime.

An individual may not view this as the true or correct outcome, but is should be considered a reasonable and legitimate law, binding on all citizens. This system does keep open the opportunities for citizens to continue to argue (using public reason) to change a law, even if they don’t win a majority. It is not a fault that public reason does not always lead to general agreement of views – debate using public reason deepens our understanding of one another.

6.2 It may be objected that any political conception of justice will be too narrow, and that it will be necessary to rely on comprehensive doctrines to show what is right. Public reason is compatible with forms of non-public reason. It merely requires that ideas about what is right (even if they are based on comprehensive doctrines) are expressed in terms that are politically reasonable to all citizens.

6.3 It is important within political liberalism that citizens have both a comprehensive and a political conception of justice. The overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines allow for a political conception of justice supporting a constitutional democratic society. If a comprehensive doctrine can’t support a democratic society, it is considered unreasonable. This type of comprehensive doctrine (such as fundamentalist religious, or a doctrine of divine right of monarchs) does not satisfy reciprocity and does not establish equal basic liberties. Political liberalism rejects as unreasonable all doctrines that override the political values of a constitutional democratic society

A true judgment in a reasonable comprehensive doctrine should never conflict with a reasonable judgment in its related political conception. If needed, citizens can affirm, revise, or change their political comprehensive doctrines. A religious person may argue that religious values such as salvation and eternal life are more important than any political values. However, these considerations do not need to override reasonable values. In endorsing a constitutional democracy, a religion may say that such are the limits God sets to our liberty

6.4 Another possible objection is the idea that public reason is unnecessary and serves no purpose in a well-established constitutional democracy. Public reason would only be necessary if a society is sharply divided or includes many hostile religious or secular groups. This objection is incorrect, if citizens’ did not use public reason and civility, hostilities would assert themselves over time. Harmony among doctrines is not a permanent condition of social life.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Can democracy and comprehensive doctrines, religious and non religious, be compatible; if so, how? To answer, political liberalism makes the distinction between a self-standing political conception of justice and a comprehensive doctrine. Conflicts between democracy and reasonable religious doctrines and among reasonable religious doctrines are greatly mitigated within the bounds of reasonable principles of justice in a constitutional democratic society. Citizens practice political toleration, and provide both religious and non-religious reasons for toleration. It is acceptable for concordant judgments made within political conceptions of justice on one hand and comprehensive doctrines on the other.

Three main kinds of conflict set citizens at odds. 1) Differences may arise because comprehensive doctrines are irreconcilable. To solve this, citizens affirm political conceptions of justice and public reasons that others can agree with. 2) Differences may arise because of differences in status, gender, race, etc. Reasonable principles of justice will help to ensure that these kinds of conflict need not arise. 3) Conflict may arise because of differences in judgment. This type of conflict will always exist.

7.2 Reasonable persons are characterized in two ways:

(1) They stand ready to offer fair terms of social cooperation between equals, and they abide by these terms if others do also, even should it be to their advantage not to;

(2) Reasonable persons recognize and accept the consequences of the burdens of judgment, which leads to the idea of reasonable toleration in a democratic society

Some fundamentalist religious doctrines, or dictatorial rules will reject ideas of public reason and deliberative democracy. They will assert that the religiously true overrides the politically reasonable. This type of doctrine is politically unreasonable. These unreasonable doctrines pose a threat to democratic institutions, since their existence prevents the full realization of a reasonable democratic society with the ideal of public reason and legitimate law. In reality, every actual society will contain some unreasonable doctrines. Society must determine how far to tolerate these doctrines based on appropriate principles of justice.

7.3 There is a fundamental difference between “A Theory of Justice” and “Political Liberalism.” “A Theory of Justice” attempted to develop a comprehensive liberal doctrine – something based on the social contract and superior to utilitarianism. However, the comprehensive doctrine contradicted the fact of reasonable pluralism. “Political Liberalism” proposed that a reasonable political conception of justice could be formed based on overlapping comprehensive doctrines. In “A Theory of Justice” public reason is given by a comprehensive liberal doctrine. In “Political Liberalism” public reason is a way of reasoning about political values shared by free and equal citizens that does not trespass on citizens’ comprehensive doctrines, so long as those doctrines are consistent with a democratic polity.

Democracy and Disagreement: The Sense of Reciprocity

Democracy and Disagreement

Chapter 2: The Sense of Reciprocity

Amy Gutman and Denis Thompson

Gutman and Thompson promote the principle of reciprocity as the basis of deliberative democracy. They emphasize that reciprocity is based on mutual respect. Political arguments should be based on reasoning that can be understood and accepted by other citizens interesting in reaching agreement. In cases, such as the abortion issue, where there is fundamental deliberative disagreement, Gutman and Thompson present the principles of accommodation. These principles promote the importance of affirming the moral status of their own views as well as acknowledging the moral standing of their opponents views. Based on mutual respect, citizens should aim to find an ‘economy of moral disagreement,’ emphasizing areas and solutions based on mutual agreement.

Introduction

Deliberative democracy asks citizens and officials to justify public policy by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who are bound by it. It relies on the principle of reciprocity. We can compare reciprocity to its two main rivals: prudence and partiality. The foundation of reciprocity is the capacity to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake. Under reciprocity, individuals aim to use mutually acceptable justification for their reasoning in the sense that they can be acknowledged by each citizen in circumstances of equal advantage. Citizens are motivated by the desire to justify their reasoning to others. Under reciprocity, individuals use deliberation with the goal of reaching deliberative agreement.

Prudence only aims to show that a policy is mutually advantageous. Individuals are motivated by self-interest. They use the process of bargaining to reach a modus Vivendi (agree to disagree). Impartiality aims at reasons and justifications that are general (universally justifiable): they should be acceptable to anyone similarly situated in morally relevant respects (reasons should be based on social or economic status, for example). The reasons provided should be impersonal; citizens should disregard their own personal perspective when making policies or laws. People are led by altruism to make laws for the common good. They establish the truth of their comprehensive moral view through demonstration of its correctness.

Reciprocity can deal with moral disagreement better than prudence or impartiality. It allows some space for bargaining as well as for comprehensive moral views, as long as these are constrained by reciprocity.

Since citizens in a pluralist society are likely to continue to hold competing comprehensive views, the principles of democracy must provide some guidance for living with fundamental moral disagreement, not simply resolving it. Reciprocity provides this guidance by setting standards for practices of mutual respect (principles of accommodation).

Reciprocity and Its Rivals

In democratic politics citizens must cooperate to make their lives go well. Reciprocity regulates public reason in a deliberative democracy, where public reason is defined as the terms in which citizens justify to one another their claims regarding all goods.

What Reciprocity Requires

Deliberative reciprocity expresses two related requirements – one moral, one empirical. The moral require asks that citizens appeal to reasons or principles that can be shared by citizens similarly motivated. For example, one might argue for national health care based on a principle of basic opportunity for all citizens. This would not be satisfied by a person who refuses to press public claims in terms accessible to their fellow citizens. The empirical reciprocity requirement asks that empirical claims be consistent with relatively reliable methods of inquiry, or should at least be based on plausible claims.

Religious fundamentalists may argue that their appeals are accessible to other citizens, as long as the citizens live a spiritual religious life, as they do. However, any claim fails to respect reciprocity if it imposes a requirement on other citizens to adopt one’s sectarian way of life as a condition of gaining access to the moral understanding that is essential to judging the validity of one’s moral claims.

In summary, reciprocity tells citizens to appeal to reasons that are recognizably moral in form and mutually acceptable in content. By comparison, prudence questions need for morality (If its mutually acceptable, why do you need it to be moral?), and impartiality challenges the need for mutual acceptance (If its moral, why do you need it to be mutually acceptable?).

What Prudence Prescribes

Much of everyday democratic politics consists of various forms of bargaining (deal-making, pork-barreling, coalition-building, etc.), and takes place over issues without moral disagreement. The problem is that prudence rests on too thin a conception of what citizens owe one. In bargaining, have no reasons to promote the well-being of other citizens, and can justify attempting to maximize our own advantage over the well-being of others. Citizens confront each other as adversaries rather than cooperators. Bargaining is even worse when considered under non-ideal (real life) situations in which we can expect conditions of inequality. The outcome of bargaining will not seem fair to a person that had a poor bargaining position.

What Impartiality Implies

Impartiality argues that political reasoning should be moral, but that it doesn’t need to be mutually acceptable in the way reciprocity prescribes. If moral claim is correct from an impersonal perspective, then that is all the justification it needs. In the face of disagreement, impartiality tells us to choose the morally correct view and demonstrate its correctness to our fellow citizens, who, if they are rational, should accept it. Disagreement is just a failing of moral reasoning – citizens should simply take a more impersonal view to solve it. This method creates a shared comprehensive moral view that applies to a variety of human activities. Some groups, such as communitarians seek such a comprehensive morality (within a particular community).

Abortion Example

A challenge for these competing views is seen in the abortion debate. It does not seem possible to find conclusive reasons that can be accepted by all citizens who are motivated to find fair terms of social cooperation (reciprocity). Some believe fetus is a constitutional person with rights that trump those of the pregnant woman. Others believe the fetus is only a potential person, and therefore has no constitutional rights. Impartiality cannot address this issue, either. It would either lead to the majority suppressing the minority point of view, or in banning the issue from the political agenda to ensure toleration (just as religion is banned from the political agenda to ensure religious toleration). However, neutrality on this issue is not possible. Not legislating against abortion could be seen as legalizing abortion. Even if toleration were justified on impartial grounds, it would not leave open the option to resolve these moral disagreements in the future – it would lock in the moral divisions.

This type of persistent form of moral disagreement can come in a number of forms. There may be conflicting reasonable beliefs (about status of the fetus, for example) or a different balance of competing moral considerations (relative risks to the guilty and the innocent in capital punishment). In these cases, there is no mutually acceptable position from which either can be rejected.

Reciprocity in Practice

An example of reciprocity can be seen in the Hawkins County 1983 text book example. The Hawkins County Public schools aim to help students “become good citizens in their school, community, and society.” However, some parents objected to portions of a new textbook, because they felt it conflicted with Bible. Among the issues were the fact that 1) the book contained a story about a Catholic settlement in New Mexico, which the parents felt teaches children Catholicism, 2) it contained a story in which a boy cooks and girl reads, which parents felt undermined the gender differences taught in the bible, 3) contained an excerpt from Anne Frank’s Diary saying that nonorthodox belief in God may be better than no belief at all, which parents felt conflicted with bible teaching, and 4) included a passage about the Renaissance idea of “a belief in the dignity and worth of human beings,” which parents argued is incompatible with true religious faith.

The principle of prudence could not deal with this issue well. Bargaining may result in the school board having to change the text book, regardless of the merits of the arguments. Impartiality would simply result in a face-off between the two comprehensive moral views.

Reciprocity requires reasons that can be justified to all parties who are motivated to find fair terms of social cooperation. The parents reasoning appeal to values that can and should be rejected by citizens of a pluralist society committed to protecting the basic liberties and opportunities of all citizens. Teaching about issues such as “human dignity” is essential to the basis of deliberative democracy. The parents’ claims were not based on mutually acceptable reasons. Also, their empirical claims were not justifiable. For example, it is not clear that if students read about a religion, they are more likely to convert to it. The court of appeals decided in favor of the school board (not to change the text books).

At the Edges of Reciprocity

Many political disagreements cannot be resolved through reasoning that satisfies only the requirements of reciprocity, but it can provide standards for regulating the processes by which they may be resolved, and for sustaining the practices of accommodation when they cannot be resolved.

Bargaining in its Place

It is possible that at times moral stakes may be high, but the disagreement is not primarily over moral issues. For example, in debating NAFTA, both opponents and proponents expressed an interest in helping vulnerable workers and protecting the government. Lautenberg: argued that NAFTA would impose hardship on “the most vulnerable members of our economy,” while Bradley argued that rejection of NAFTA would make things worse for the most vulnerable workers in U.S. and Mexico. The disagreement was only on how to achieve the particular moral claims, and empirical methods were inadequate to resolve the disagreement. In this situation, bargaining would be more appropriate than leaving the issue unresolved. The collective results of individual deals should be considered on the merits, but it is possible to use bargaining to make a deal acceptable to all.

Bargaining is permitted by reciprocity even in some cases when deliberation would be morally preferable. For example, if some groups refuse to deliberate or if deliberation would put them at a further disadvantage. For example, Candidates should not refuse PAC contributions unless their challengers also refuse them, even though it’s better for the system if PAC isn’t taken at all. However, it’s not true that lying is ok, just because the other candidate is lying. In these cases (when bargaining is necessary because deliberation is unfair), reciprocity prescribes institutional change – reciprocity is not only a disposition of individuals, but also a quality of institutions.

Dealing with Deliberative Disagreement

A deliberative disagreement is a disagreement in which citizens continue to differ about basic moral principles even though they seek a resolution that is mutually justifiable. This can occur if moral understanding does not tell us which position to reject or if competing moral claims are incompatible. Though reciprocity cannot resolve these issues, deliberation can continue.

The public controversy over legalizing abortion is the paradigm of a deliberative agreement: both sides make fundamentally different, but plausible, claims that are reciprocal in their moral and empirical content. Pro-choice advocates make the moral argument that the fetus is only potential human being, and that women should have liberty to decide whether to bear a child. Pro-life advocates make the moral argument that the fetus is human being with constitutional rights, and that innocent persons should not be killed. Though both sides agree that innocent people should not be killed, and that women have a basic liberty to live their own lives and control their own bodies, they have radically different conclusions about abortion. This is due to disagreements about the status of fetus, and the different hierarchy of claims used by each. Pro-choice advocates make empirical claims about the effects of unwanted pregnancy and childbearing on women. Pro-life advocates present the scientific facts about the development of an egg into a sentient fetus. These empirical claims are testable or at least plausible. Given the different moral and empirically relevant claims, there is no way to rationally resolve the argument. Disagreement on this issue is fundamental and irresolvable, at least within the limits of our present moral understanding.

Some have tried to resolve disagreement based on common ground leading to a mutually acceptable conclusion. Ronald Dworkin argued for an agreement based on the fact that a fetus is a human life (pro-life view), but since it is not conscious or sentient, it has no interests, and since it has no interests, it should not be considered a constitutional person (pro-choice view). However, this rests on the assumption that human beings cannot have constitutional rights unless they have prior sentience or consciousness, and this claim is not defended on mutually justifiable grounds.

Deliberative democracy recognizes that the government must take a stand on questions involving such disagreement, even if reciprocity and its other constitutive principles do not determine the answer. Some might argue that in these types of cases, individuals should be uncertain of the truth of their own positions, and should just reach their own best judgment, avoiding dogmatism. The moral strength of their opponents’ case should be irrelevant to their political actions.

However, Gutman argues that unlike ordinary moral conflict, deliberative disagreement places some citizens in opposition to others who are no less committed to finding fair terms of cooperation, and who are offering reasons that cannot be shown to violate those terms. For this reason, one could respect someone arguing for abortion in a way not possible for someone arguing for racial discrimination, for example. It is important to acknowledge that opponents have some moral standing

The Meaning of Moral Accommodation

The principles of accommodation are based on mutual respect – the same value that makes up the core of reciprocity. This principle makes possible to cooperate on fair terms. It requires more that simply agreeing to disagree, it also requires that one have a favorable attitude toward and constructive interaction with the person one disagrees with. People should remain open to changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in the future. This keeps open the possibility of a different, more accommodating solution in the future. Mutual respect discourages dogmatism (i.e. Either you’re for killing babies or your against it!) as well as moral skepticism (No one can tell who’s right, so let’s not try).

Mutual respect can be beneficial only if it’s translated to practices that guide actual political life – these are the principles of accommodation. The principles of accommodation explain how citizens who, after deliberation, still fundamentally disagree about an issue should treat one another – even when their deliberation results in legislation that favors one side of a dispute. The principles of accommodation make two kinds of demands on citizens. 1) How citizens present their own political positions, and 2) how they regard the political positions of others. These refer not mainly to style or rhetoric, but to attitudes in public action.

Civic Integrity

The first principle, civic integricty, states that citizens should affirm the moral status of their own political positions. They can do this through:

1) Consistency in Speech: Citizens should hold the same positions regardless of circumstances in which they speak. This indicates that a person holds the position for the reasons of morality, not (only) for reasons of political advantage.

2) Consistency between Speech and Action: Apparent inconsistencies call for candid explanations.

3) Integrity of Principle – Individuals should accept the broader implications of the principles presupposed by one’s moral positions. If you oppose abortion out of respect for fetal life, you should also be interested in other efforts to care for children adequately.

Civic Magnanimity

The second principle of accommodation calls on citizens and officials to acknowledge the moral status of the positions they oppose. This is done through:

1) Acknowledgement in speech: Citizens should treat the opposing position as expressing a moral rather than a purely strategic, political, or economic view.

2) Open-mindedness: Though they may hold firm convictions, individuals should maintain the possibility that citizens can be convinced of the moral merits of their adversaries’ position. Both the political mind and political forums should be kept open to reconsidering decisions that have already made.

3) Economy of moral disagreement: Citizens should minimize rejection of the position they oppose, and avoid unnecessary conflict in characterizing the moral grounds of their opponent’s argument. One should aim to search for points of convergence between one’s own understanding and others.

The Economy of Moral Disagreement in Action

Judith Jarvis Thomson narrows the range of reasonable disagreement between pro-life and pro-choice advocates to cases in which pregnancy results from largely voluntary sexual intercourse. However, her argument doesn’t deal with situations not involving rape or other force.

Roe v. Wade did not claim that fetuses is person, but it did state that the state has an interest in protecting potential life (though fetuses are not constitutional persons). This allowed states to continue to ban abortion in the third trimester, on the grounds that the state’s interest in potential life is compelling once the fetus is viable.

The court went further than normal pro-life or pro-choice arguments by arguing that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the health of pregnant women even against their own will. This was an argument against second trimester abortions, since they are riskier than normal childbirth. This resulted in people arguing about the effect of abortion on maternal health when their actual purpose was to protect prenatal life.

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey the court upheld state restrictions on first and second trimester abortions (such as 24-hour waiting periods) so long as they do not impose an “undue burden” on women’s liberty or pose “substantial obstacles” to women who want to have an abortion. This shows one way that pro-life concerns can be accommodated without giving up commitment to women’s liberty.

Some have suggested a moral compromise, such as making abortions legal, but not providing government funding for elective abortions. The idea is that pro-choice advocates should not have to give up legalization, but they should give up policies that would increase the number of abortions. However, the refusal to fund abortions for poor women, when childbirth is funded, creates an almost irresistible pressure on indigent women to carry a child to term and violates the basic liberty of the indigent woman to choose between these alternatives. Therefore, this is not a justifiable means for limiting the number of abortions. Though perhaps a scheme allowing citizens to elect whether or not to put some of their tax money towards funds for abortions would be a legitimate compromise.

Accommodation calls on citizens to promote policies where their principles converge, even if they would otherwise place these policies lower on their list of political priorities. For example, programs that help unwed mothers care for their own children may become more important as areas of mutual agreement.

Mutual respect likely requires institutional changes. Forums of political discussion should be designed to encourage officials to justify actions with moral reasons and give others the opportunity to criticize those reasons. Perhaps legislators, like judges, could explain in writing the basis of their decisions. Another possibility would be to create incentives for reconsidering important moral decisions and policies at regular intervals.

Democracy within the Limits of Reciprocity

Reciprocal democracy accepts the need to promote sustentative moral principles in politics – principles that could become part of a public morality for the society as a whole. In cultivating the virtue of open-minded commitment among citizens and in encouraging an economy of moral disagreement in politics, reciprocity orients citizens and public officials towards a deliberative perspective compatible with continuing moral agreement. The principle of reciprocity supports a political process that promotes moral learning. Deliberative democracy does not require consensus on public policy or constitutional law. Since politics cannot be purged of moral conflict, it seeks a common view on how citizens should publicly deliberate.

The Ethics of Care

The Ethics of Care

Chapter 10: Care and Justice in the Global Context

By Virginia Held

In this chapter of Ethics of Care, Virginia Held explains how the ethics of care can be applied in the global context. She first differentiates the ethics from care from the dominant moral theories (Kantianism, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics). The ethics of care focuses on relationships, not on individual actions of dispositions. It is concerned with emotions rather than simply rationality and logic. Held believes current theory has led to an overemphasis on the part of states on military security and autonomy and economic preeminence. The ethics of care emphasizes cultivating rations of trust, listening to the concerns of others, fostering international cooperation, and valuing interdependence. She notes that the ethics of care would help to eliminate discrimination in the economic value of women’s occupations over men, and the separation of public and private. Held argues that fostering caring relationships across countries can help people in different countries and cultures “live in peace, respect each other’s rights, to care together for the environment, and to improve the lives of their children.”

Chapter 10: Care and Justice in the Global Context

The field of international relations guides thinking about the world and relations between states. It has a normative component (e.g. how do we avoid wars) and an empirical component (e.g. realism). Global justice has become a familiar topic concerned with ethics and international affairs. However, International relations has been one of the last social sciences to be affected by the awareness of gender issues. Held believes that we have been socialized to believe that war and power politics, which have been the focus of realism, are things to which men have a special affinity. However, gender shapes our identification of global actors, characterization of state and non-state actions, framing of global problems, and consideration of possible alternatives. The ethics of care provides an alternative approach to international affairs.

The Ethics of Care and International Affairs

The ethics of care offers a distinctive challenge to the dominant moral theories such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics. In Rawls (which uses Kantianism) justice is the primary value in political and social arrangements. It focuses on fair distribution of products of economic activity and positions of power. Utilitarianism aims to maximize the utility of all persons. IT’s less able to protect individual rights against majority interests, but it is able to justify legal protection of rights.

The ethics of care differs in its assumptions, goals, and methods. It is a new and distinct theory (not just part of virtue ethics, as some suggest). While Kant and utilitarians see agents as independent and autonomous, and virtue theory focuses on individuals and their dispositions, ethics of care pays attention to the relations among persons, and sees people as enmeshed in relations between persons.

Ethics of care is able to deal with the realities of unequal power and unchosen relations (parent, child), rather than assuming society is entered into voluntarily by free and equal individuals, as other theories do.

Dominant moral theories contrast individual aims and moral claims of everyone; the aim is to follow one’s own interests while being constrained by universal rules. The ethics of care see moral life as populated by caring relations in which the interests of self and other are mingled, and trust is crucial. This helps to explain the importance of group or cultural ties.

Ethics of justice focus on issues of fairness, equality, and individual rights. The ethics of Care focuses on attentiveness to context, trust, and responding to needs. It cultivates caring relations in both personal, political, and global contexts.

Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism rely entirely on reason. The ethics of care includes the contribution of emotions in understanding what morality recommends. It argues that empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness may be better guides than highly abstract rules applying to all persons.

The ethics of care values caring relations and their associated concerns of trust and mutual responsiveness. Care must concern itself with the effectiveness of its efforts to meet needs, but also with the motives with which care is provided.

Though there are many differences between the traditional forms of ethics and the ethics of care, they are in some ways compatible. Justice should be incorporated into morally acceptable practices of care. Caring relations should be acknowledged as the wider and deeper context within which we seek justice and in certain domains give it priority. For example, in the area of law, the language and principles of justice ought to have priority. However, the law shouldn’t be the model for all of moral life.

If the values of care were incorporated into existing practices, there would be a number of changes. Environmental concerns would be accorded the importance they deserve. The ethics of care would ensure the market doesn’t become ever more pervasive, and would ensure that globalization doesn’t occur at the expense of caring relations throughout the world. The ethics of care promote respecting rights within a society, since this requires that persons care enough about each other to be willing to think of each other as fellow members of whatever group is asserting rights.

Implications for Global Change

The ethics of care is applicable to globalizing democracy. It’s responsiveness to the particular needs of interests of individuals or groups at the social level has a political parallel in the concern for providing the economic and social means for the development of individuals. The ethics of care clearly implies that a society must recognize its responsibilities to children and other dependents. Members of wealthy societies must recognize their responsibilities to alleviate the hunger in poor ones.

Relying on unpaid labor of women in the household for the provision of care is inconsistent with the values of care as well as of justice. The ethics of care calls for state support of various forms of caring. It recommends equal participation of men in caring activities, and equal participation of women in political and economic structures. The ethics of care calls for the transformation of different segments of society. Caring values and cooperation should replace hierarchies and domination based on gender, class, race, and ethnicity. Education, health care, and child care institutions should be well supported and developed. Instead of domination by military and economic and political power, caring activities should be the center of attention, effort, and support.

The ethics of care should transform international political relations between states. It notices rather than ignores the cultural construct of masculinity in the behavior of states, including overemphasis on the part of states on military security and economic preeminence, neglect of environmental and ecological concerns, moral acceptability of policies to those affected, and cultivating cooperative behavior with others. The influence of this exaggerated image of masculinity for the state is seen in the behavior of the United States under George Bush in the unilateral war against Iraq, the bullying of allies, and the rejection of UN restraints.

Feminists have shown that Hobbes’ view of the political world is gender-biased. How can helpless infants become adults if human nature is universally competitive and hostile? Given this question, it makes sense to argue humans are naturally cooperative, or children would not survive.

However, realists and neorealists have brought Hobbes’ view to the international arena. They advocate preparation for war and avoidance of dependence on others as the road to security. Morganthau and Waltz argue that maximizing military power and maintaining autonomy lead to success. The ethics of care, on the other hand, argues for cultivating rations of trust, listening to the concerns of others, fostering international cooperation, and valuing interdependence.

In the global context, the state is often thought of as a region of security and order, while the rest of the world is dangerous, anarchic, and violent (Hobbe’s war against all). This seems to be an analogy to the safety of a household in a heartless world. The military is like the male “protector” of the home. However, feminists have shown that violence against women and children occurs in families and in states. The militarized state seems more of a threat than a protector.

It is easy to see how far the relations between states are from the assumptions of traditional moral theories. The relations are not based on freely chosen contracts between equal individuals. Boundaries are often formed through force and fraud, and there are large and increasing gaps between the rich and poor in the world.

Care and Political Economy

In the past, the recommendations and requirements of economic development have not been gender neutral. Historians argue that pre-colonial societies were often more elastic and egalitarian in their gender divisions of labor. Colonialism made gender differentiation in these societies more pronounced and rigid. In a variety of ways, women have been marginalized by globalization. In Eastern Europe, for example, globalization led women to lose their state-sponsored maternity health care, maternity leave, and child care. They became unattractive employees to private industries.

The situation could be improved if the value of the unpaid caring work that women do was recognized by economists. This would help to undermine the assumed greater importance of “production” over “reproduction” and “public” over “private.”

Development agencies have only recently begun to consider the effects of their policies on women. However, they still resist upsetting gendered divisions of labor that privilege the work that men do. It is true that changes in “cultural practices” concerning gender do need to arise from women within those societies, rather than be imposed by outside agencies, but the obstacles to doing so should be recognized.

Imperialistic Approaches

Great care needs to be taken to avoid imperialism in thinking and in programs when women in the North are considering women in post-colonial societies. It is important to recognize the differences between women in different classes, ethnic groups, and regions in the developing world. Western women must be careful not to view South in objectifying, patronizing way. However, there is still a responsibility for women from the North to help. Western feminists should oppose neoliberal globalization that leads to increased inequality among and within countries.

The Future of Care

Mainstream international relations theories have “resulted in the creation of a global ‘culture of neglect’ through a systematic devaluing of notions of interdependence, relatedness, and positive involvement in the lives of distant others.” The ethics of care could help to remedy this.

Until recently, violence against women was not part of international human rights agenda. The public/ private distinction was reproduced at the international level, with many forms of violence against women considered “unfortunate cultural practices outside of the state’s or international system’s responsibilities.” The tradition view of the priority of political rights over economic and social rights has been unfortunate for women.

Under the ethics of care, the relationship between economic, political, and cultural domains would transform. Responsibility for global environment would be central concern, as would fostering economic development that meets human needs. Under the ethics of care, resolution of conflict through threat and use of force would decrease. Growth and acceptance of international law and other restraints would occur and be expressive of care, though even in a society led by the ethics of care, it would be possible for violence to be used as a last resort.

In a society where multiple ties of care have expanded to include the whole human community, poverty and exclusion would be on the wane. Ties between poor women within a state help to decrease violence and exploitation, and ties between persons from different states can decrease international hostility. The North and South need to engage in friendship and caring economic development, not a relationship of limited benevolence and humiliation.

The ethics of care fits with the current trend of increased influence of nongovernmental organizations, global networks (Slaughter), and the “Global civil society” (Keane). These theories describe the wide range of organizations on many levels creating international connections. These networks and theories would benefit from a focus on the ethics of care, and could be enhanced by using the ethics of care to evaluate global developments and promote the best of them.

“Globalization of caring relations would help enable people of different states and cultures to live in peace, respect each other’s rights, to care together for the environment, and to improve the lives of their children.”

Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender

Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender

By Susin Moller Okin

Susin Okin argues that Rawls Theory of Justice should be applied to issues of gender and family. She explains, using quotes from both “A Theory of Justice” as well as “Political Liberalism” to show that Rawls himself was ambiguous about including the family as part of the basic structure – sometimes including it and sometimes seeming to exclude it. Okin argues that because the family is so important to early child development, the family must be included in the basic structure to ensure the stability of a society based on Rawls’ theory. An unjust family would not be able to provide the foundation of political values that Rawls believes citizens must develop. Okin also argues that justice for women requires more than just formal equality under the law, but also steps to ensure that past, caste-like social practices are not systematically continued, and that they instead have true “equality of opportunity.”

Introduction

Susin Okin provides a feminist view (i.e. thinking particularly about women and the family) on Rawls Theory. Okin argues that Rawl’s theory has a great potential to address issues of gender and family, and suggests how is ideas can be extended to include them. Rawls first wrote “A Theory of Justice” (abbreviated as “Theory”) and later revised it in his book “Political Liberalism.” Okin points out some mixed signals given in the two books about how women are supposed to fit into his theory. She notes that in “Theory” Rawls listed family as part of the basic structure, and assumed that in some form the family is just. In “Political Liberalism” he says that he had previously omitted “the justice of and in the family.” He abandons the assumption that the people in the original position are “heads of families” and adds “sex” to the list of morally irrelevant contingencies in the original position. However, in Political Liberalism, Rawls focuses on issues of religious and philosophical toleration, not on gender. He even suggests that race, ethnicity, and gender “may seem of an altogether different character calling for different principles of justice, which Theory does not discuss.” Then again, he says his principles of justice “should be widely applicable to our own problems also.”

The Family as Part of the Basic Structure

In “Theory” Rawls includes “the monogamous family” as part of the basic structure, and devotes part of section 3 to dealing with the family’s role in early moral education. In “Political Liberalism” he further develops the idea of a “political conception of justice,” which is not a comprehensive doctrine. He stresses that it applies only to “the basic structure of society.” He does mention that “the nature of the family” belongs to the basic structure.

Rawls explains that the basic structure includes institutions that “have deep and long-term social effects and in fundamental ways shape citizens’ character and aims, the kinds of persons they are and aspire to be.” Okin argues that this definition would clearly include the family, and that therefore, the family should be regulated by the principles of justice.

However, there is some evidence that Rawls did not intend to include the family as part of the basic structure. “Political Liberalism” focuses only on the public and political nature of institutions. Rawls states, “The political is distinct… from the personal and the familial, which are affectional… in ways the political” is not. Okin argues that though families are sometimes characterized by affection, at other times they are characterized by power and vulnerability. In fact, Rawls notes that “individual members of families [need protection] from other family members (wives from their husbands, children from their parents).”

Okin suggests that the main reason Rawls is reluctant to consistently apply his standards to the justice of family is because he places emphasis on his theory as a poltical theory only, not a comprehensive moral theory. He believes this is important in order for the theory to be realistic – we have to assume that there will be reasonable pluralism (many incompatible comprehensive doctrines) in a democracy.

Congruence in a Well-Ordered Society

Rawls argues that it’s desirable for the values people hold in their political and non-political lives should be similar. He says that the full autonomy of citizens “presupposes that the fundamental ideas of justice as fairness are present in the public culture, or at least implicit in the history of its main institutions and traditions of their interpretation.” However, he also argues that the non-political aspects of lives – personal morality or religion – can hold views that there is a “hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic values.”

Okin argues that this suggests that persons in a just society are “split” into public and nonpublic, politicial and non-political selves. She argues that this is not possible. A girl and a boy raised in a very traditional religious household teaching traditional gender roles and authority would not be consistent with both children becoming “free and equal citizens.”

Okin argues that some religious and other comprehensive doctrines that Rawls would like to include, should not be considered reasonable for inclusion in a just society. Rawls defines reasonable: “Reasonable persons… desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others.”

Rawls gives two possible arguments for what to do about unreasonable doctrines. In one, he argues that they should be constrained so that they don’t undermine the unity and justice of society, but that they will always exist. In what Okin argues is the stronger position, Rawls says that the political conception has to actually restrict permissible comprehensive views – the basic institutions built on principles of justice will encourage some ways of life and discourage others, or even exclude them all together. He includes as examples doctrines that require degrading people because of their racial or ethnic backgrounds. A doctrine that demanded slavery would have no claims within a just society.

Rawls argues that all the main historical religions would be seen as reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Okin disagrees, since many religions circumscribe women’s roles and instill a hierarchy. She believes there is a conflict between freedom of religion and equality of women.

Ralws provides an example that says it would be ok for children to be educated in sects that “oppose the culture of the modern world.” He simply argues that the children must be taught their constitutional and civic rights, and understand the political conception of justice. Okin argues that the compulsory public schooling (which seems to be implied) would help to counteract some aspects of gender inequality taught in some comprehensive doctrines. However, it may not be fully effective while the primary environment of these children is teaching inequality. Therefore, she argues that political liberalism is not able to be as widely tolerant of different religious conceptions of the good as Rawls would like it to be, because the degree of sex discrimination preached goes beyond Rawls definition of reasonableness.

The Family as a Potential School of Justice

In “Theory”, Rawls regarded the family as playing an important first role in the formation of citizens’ sense of justice. He said that healthy moral development in early life depends on parent-child love, trust, affection, example, and guidance. Okin argues that it is hard to see how families not themselves regulated by principles of justice and fairness could play a positive role in the moral education of citizens of a just society.

In Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasizes that we grow up in society, and do not just join it at the age of reason. He notes the role of basic institutions in establishing a social world in which we can develop with care, nurture, and education into free and equal citizens. However, his explanation of how this happens is less satisfactory and plausible – he says nothing about early childhood, but just notes that people acquire these political virtues by living under just “basic institutions.” Okin believes that Rawls was right the first time (in “Theory”) where he stressed the family as the first “school of justice.” This is missing from “Political Liberalism.”

Typical Contemporary Families as Poor Schools of Justice

In another paper, Okin argues that heterosexual couples-based families in our society are unjust in their distributions between women and men of work, power, opportunity, leisure, access to resources, and other important goods. She provides some examples from studies showing how the division of labor between adults in a household affects children. In general she finds that children magnify the unequal division of work.

In traditional households (father wage-earner, mother housewife), researchers found that boys and girls do approximately the same amount of household work, but it is divided along traditional gendered lines. In “drudge wife” households (mom and dad work, mom also does all housework) girls do 25% more than in traditional households, and boys do 1/3 as much – i.e. girls do four times as much work as boys. In hierarchical traditional families, women do not regard the situation as fair, but they accept as inevitable the power of the male family head over many of their activities and decisions.

Two Problems of Stability

Rawls says in Political Liberalism that “the problem of stability is fundamental to political philosophy.” Since no comprehensive conception of justice can be shared, he restricts his conception to the political based on overlapping consensus. Rawls says that stability includes “whether people who grow up under just institutions (as the political conception defines them) acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice so that they can comply with those institutions.” He argues that this is achieved by the moral psychology in which citizens living in a well-ordered society acquire a sense of justice. However, Okin argues that if families are not required to be just, then this account of moral psychology has uncertain foundations.

If families teach inequality rather than egalitarianism, their role in inculcating political virtues may be limited. Families are particularly important because of their influence in early childhood development. Okin arguest that this shows that Rawls solution to one problem of stability (restricting his theory to the political and allowing many comprehensive doctrines) renders another problem of stability intractable (the family is not required to be just, so it is not clear how political virtues are to develop.)

What Does Justice for Women Require?

Rawls says in intro to Political Liberalism that inequality and oppression of women can be thought about, within the framework of his theory, by appeal to the same principle of equality that Lincoln evoked in order to condemn slavery. Okin points out that Lincoln can be read as supporting purely formal equality between black and white Americans (in the law) or as requiring various measures aimed at considerably more substantive equality. In addition to formal equality, a more substantive anti-caste principle would ensure that social disadvantages would not be turned into systematic disadvantages in education, wealth, political influence, etc.

Okin argues that social justice for women has not been, and will not be, achieved by formal equality alone – merely changing the law does allow women (or slaves) to have “free equality of opportunity.” Though the legal subordination of women (hours and location of paid work, lack of public child care, etc.) has largely been overturned, social structures based on these things have remained. Just as slaves needed to be provided land so that they weren’t forced into wage labor under racist conditions, so women need things like parental leave and subsidized child care so that they can work for pay without being exploited because they are parents. Rawls’ theory has a great potential to address the injustices of labor - thinking about gender and families from an original position can provide important insights.