Passed ISEP Comp

One exciting thing I found out is that I passed my international security and economic policy comprehensive exam! In fact, my professors said that they agreed that it was “exemplary!”

This means that I am completely finished with all six comprehensive exams required for my PhD program!

ISEP Comprehensive Exam - Complete!

Late yesterday afternoon, I turned in my international security comprehensive exam - my last-ever comprehensive exam for my PhD! I put a ton of hours into it, and if I had more time, there are things I know I would have looked into a bit more, but overall, I think it turned out really well!

My essay ended up being about 10,000 words long (17 single-spaced pages), and most of my blog readers probably don't want to know that much about international security policy, but I'll post the question and my executive summary, and if you really want to read the whole thing, I've got a link to the full pdf at the bottom of the page!


In the literature you have reviewed there has been a lengthy discussion of the relative significance of military power and legal regulation in determining the state of international security. Explicitly applying your knowledge of that literature, please assess how these determinants have affected the development of space activity up to this point. Please also discuss how the balance of these and other determinants might change in the future and identify what the principal causes of change might be.

This paper has been broken into three parts. In Part I, I provide an overview of the theories relevant to understanding the relative significance of military power and legal regulation in determining the state of international security. I begin with an overview of realist theory, which assumes a rational, unitary actor in an anarchic system, with material resources and military power of states as the determinant characteristics for the state of international security. I also review institutionalist-legalist theory, which also assumes a rational, unitary actor in an anarchic system, but focuses on the importance of legal regulation in constraining state behavior and determining the state of international security. In Part II, I begin by providing a brief summary of space activity up to this point, focusing on five main aspects: the space race, the development of reconnaissance satellites, the negotiation of the outer space treaties, the increasing crowdedness of space, and the recent attempts at international cooperation on the issue of space security. I then apply realist theory to each of these areas, examining the significance of military power for the development of space activity. Next, institutionalist theory is applied to each area, examining the extent to which legal regulation constrained state behavior and thus affect these developments in space activity. I find that both military power and legal regulation were important determinants in the development of space activity up to this point, but argue that legal regulation provides more insight and explanatory power, particularly in more recent times. In Part III, I provide a brief description of the likely future conditions of the space environment and an overview of one of the chief issues for the future – space security. I then provide realist options for ensuring continued access to and use of space, which rely primarily on threats and coercion, and institutionalist options, which are based on particular forms of international agreements, primarily favoring hard law. I argue that as we look to the future of space activity, military power has a very limited role in determining future developments, primarily due to the inherent need for all space actors to adjust their behavior combined with the physical limitations of the space environment, which make military protection of space assets nearly impossible and offensive or retaliatory space attacks self-defeating. Instead, I argue that international legal regulation will be the most important determinant in the future of sustainable space activity, while other determinants, such as interdependence, may also make contributions.

Read the Full Paper!

Writing My ISEP Comp...

For my international security comprehensive exam, I was emailed an essay question last Wednesday, and I have until this coming Wednesday (1 week) to write an essay in response. This is my very last comp (of 6!), and I'm really excited to finish it.

On Friday, I woke up, printed, reviewed, and highlighted the books and papers from my reading list that I thought were most relevant. I took a bunch of notes based on my highlighting, and organized those notes into the structure of my basic outline. Then it was midnight and I went to bed. (But my mind was still going a million miles an hour, so I didn't fall asleep until 1:30am...)

I woke up at 8am, read over my notes, and started writing. Jeff made me coffee and eggs and toast - brain food.

I basically kept writing from then until about 9:30pm without any real breaks. But then, I had a full first draft written!

I'd like to review what I've written and improve it, and I also want to look at how some other papers on my reading list might fit in, but then that's it!

The Land Remote Sensing Laws and Policies of National Governments: A Global Survey

The Land Remote Sensing Laws and Policies of National Governments: A Global Survey
Prepared by Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz
2004

This article provides an overview of the development of and current trends in satellite remote sensing law and policy. Gabrynowicz states that all national data policies and laws contain the same fundamental principles: making data available for scientific, social, and economic benefit, and restricting access to some data for national security reasons. There are differences in the application of particular variables such as resolution limits, nations that are denied access, and other variables. There is a trend away from applying general principles for data sharing and towards analyzing the specifics of each request. The analysis often looks not just at what data is being requested, but who is requesting it and why. In general, national security interests are emphasized over commercial interests.

Formal law and policy is often difficult to find, though there seems to be a recognition of the need for more formal and transparent laws and policies. One common catalyst of this trend is disaster response, mitigation, and management.

The non-high resolution space-sement worldwide is mostly governmental, not private. These public entities often need to demonstrate social and economic value of the space systems. The difficulty of establishing system and data value is exacerbated by the tension between withholding data for national security purposes and making data available to increase its use (which would demonstrate economic and social value).

The article also includes, as an appendix, a nation-by-nation synopsis of relevant current and pending laws and policies, including national space and/or remote sensing law, relevant regulations, policies, and some other related laws, and data policy.

After Hegemony by Robert Keohane

After Hegemony
By Robert Keohane
Copyright 1984

In After Hegemony, Robert Keohane puts forth the theory that provides an alternative to realist hegemonic theory. Rather than suggesting that countries act only in their own interest, and therefore international cooperation can only occur when it is imposed by a hegemon, he suggests that there are other forces that allow cooperation even when there is no hegemon.

Keohane suggests that international cooperation occurs, even among purely self-interested states, when there are mutual interests. This type of situation can be modeled using the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ framework from game theory. If this game is played repeatedly, even a rational actor may choose cooperation. He argues that cooperation is particularly likely to occur within existing international regimes. These regimes are difficult to build, and are often put into place by hegemonic states. However, contrary to the idea that these cooperative regimes will fall apart when the hegemon declines in power, Keohane argues that the regimes will remain and cooperation will continue.

He states that international regimes help to reduce transaction costs among states – they allow a framework in which cooperation can take place. The repeated interactions allow states to build a reputation and to build mutual trust. Thus, when they make decisions about whether to ‘defect’ from an agreement, they must consider not only the myopic costs and benefits of that decision, but also how that action will affect cooperation on other subjects as well as cooperation in the future. Therefore, even using realist assumptions (that each country acts only in its own self-interest) you still get cooperation.

The theory of bounded rationality – the idea that individuals (and states) are not capable of processing all information to make perfectly rational decisions, but instead use methods such as ‘satisficing’ - increases likelihood of cooperation. If bounded rationality is in place, it may be even more beneficial for states to rely on existing rules and agreements, and to benefit from existing international regimes. These regimes allow states to follow standard operating procedures or ‘rules of thumb,’ rather than trying to exert resources to reconsider actions and decisions in each case of possible international cooperation.

If you also relax the assumptions of realist theory to allow the idea that countries may care about other countries’ well-being, then cooperation is even more likely, because this increases the common interests among states.

Keohane then provides examples of declining U.S. hegemony and the concurrent events in international cooperation in the monetary policy regime, trade regime, and oil regime. He suggests that hegemonic theory has good descriptive power for the years after World War II when the U.S. is the main hegemonic power – cooperation increases and the U.S. creates international regimes according to its interests and ideals. However, as American hegemony declines in the 1970’s, Keohane notes that cooperation does not disappear completely, and that a number of regimes remain, contrary to what realist hegemonic theory would suggest. He argues that this supports his cooperative theory, the idea that existing regimes provide benefits that allow countries to continue to cooperate even without a hegemon.

The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam

The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam
By Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons
Copyright 1971

Introduction
The goal of this book is to provide a theory of coercive diplomacy that is relevant for policy-makers. Generally theories in this area have been to broad and abstract to be useful in real-life situations. This requires looking at various cases to find both similarities and differences, particularly those most likely to be relevant to policy.

The Development of Doctrine and Strategy
The Korean war in 1950 was the first time the U.S. fought a limited war in which the goals had to do with policy, rather than simply being in a state of war rather than peace. In this new type of situation, the civil leaders need to be much more involved, rather than allowing military commanders in the field to take the lead. Instead, careful, limited steps need to be taken.

George gives seven criteria or requirements for controlled, measured use of force and effective crisis management:
1. Presidential control of military options. This is necessary to control the unfolding of events and adjust as necessary.
2. Pauses in military operations. The momentum of events must be slowed down to allow the opponent to assess actions taken and receive and reflect about signals and proposals addressed to him.
3. Clear and appropriate demonstrations. The presidents’ resolution and objectives must be clear so that they can be interpreted clearly by the opponent.
4. Military action coordinated with political-diplomatic action. There should be an overall strategy.
5. Confidence in the effectiveness and discriminating character of military options. Without this, the attempt to convey a clear and appropriate domenstration of resolution and objectives could backfire.
6. Military options that avoid motivating the opponent to escalate.
7. Avoidance of impression of resort to large-scale warfare.

George defines four strategies for the use of force.
1. The Quick, Decisive Military Strategy: This is the strategy traditionally favored by military strategists. IF the strategy fails, however, you likely enter a drawn-out war of attrition.
2. Coercive Diplomacy: This strategy calls for using just enough force of an appropriate kind (or even just threats of force) to demonstrate resolution to protect well-defined interests and also to demonstrate the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary. Employment of force is coupled with appropriate communications to the opponent. If it can be made to work successfully, it is a less costly, less risky way of achieving one’s objectives that the traditional military strategy.
3. Strategy of Attrition: Force can be used as an instrument of foreing policy through prolonged warfare under a set of conditions or limitations on military operations that give neither side a clear advantage.
4. Test of Capabilities Within Very Restrictive Ground Rules: Even though initial ground rules may be disadvantageous, the defending power accepts the challenge without escalating the conflict. The example is the U.S. airlift to West Berlin to cope with the Soviet blockade.

In coercive diplomacy, it is important to distinguish whether the goal is simply to persuade an opponent to stop short of his goal, or to persuade the opponent to undo his action. The latter is more difficult. It is also necessary to distinguish between the weak variant to coercive diplomacy – the ‘try-and-see’ approach, and the strong variant – the tacit-ultimatum approach. The try-and-see approach teaks one step at a time to see how the opponent will react. The tacit-ultimatum approach involves a specific demand made on the opponent and a given time limit for compliance, along with a  threat of punishment for non-compliance.

The Laos Crisis, 1960-61
When Eisenhower was in power, he set the goal of defeating the Pathet Lao, the communist forces, and restoring a government favorable to the U.S. The Kennedy administration, when it took over, significantly lowered its military and political objectives to the establishment of a cease-fire and the creation of a neutral Laos. This acknowledged that the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy is dependent on the level of motivation of one’s self as well as the opponent, and this is in turn dependent on the objectives sought. Kennedy made his new goals clear through diplomatic channels, and also allowed military advisors to put on their uniforms in Laos, signaling both a carrot and a stick. This resulted in the success in reaching his limited objective.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Kennedy used coercive diplomacy very effectively in the Cuban Missile crisis. He did this by using a strategy that included both diplomatic (usually back-channel) messages, as well as a show of force (the blockade) that allowed slow and deliberate action. He eventually used the strong variant of coercive diplomacy (an ultimatum), as well.

The Vietnam Intervention, 1964-65
President Johnson attempted to use coercive diplomacy to some extent by carrying out limited bombing in Vietnam. However, the objective was not entirely clear, likely because the administration had mixed objectives and strategies – both military and coercive diplomacy strategies. Also, the relative motivation of the two sides involved likely favored the Viet Cong rather than the United States.

Comparisons and Lessons
Based on the detailed case studies presented in the book, George concludes that only seldom – only when a special set of conditions is present – is it feasible for United States leaders to understake and succeed with the strong variant to coercive diplomacy. He provides eight conditions:
1. Strength of the United States motivation
2. Asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States
3. Clarity of American objectives
4. Sense of urgency to achieve the American objective
5. Adequate domestic political support
6. Opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation
7. Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement

He describes how the presense (or absence) of each of these conditions affected each of the three case studies. In general, he finds that Laos and Cuba had almost all conditions present, while Vietnam had almost none. He then describes six problems or tasks that can be expected to arise when this strategy is employed:
1. Risks of ultimatum – will the ultimatum be provocative?
2. Conflict between crisis management and coercive diplomacy – will adherence to requirements of crisis management dilute the sense of urgency needed for coercion?
3. Timing of strong coercive threats – has the opponent  been sufficiently impressed with your determination to regard coercive threats as credible?
4. Timing of negotiations – can negotiations be delayed until opponent is sufficiently impressed with your determination?
5. Content of carrot and stick – are the carrot and stick adequate to overcome opponent’s disinclination to accept demand?
6. Timing of carrot and stick – can the carrot and stick be applied before military actions harden opponent’s determination?

Theory of International Politics by Kenneth Waltz

Theory of International Politics
By Kenneth Waltz
Copyright 1979

In “Theory of International Politics,” Kenneth Waltz begins by discussing how to construct a good theory and providing definitions of some of the component parts. He then creates his own systemic theory of international politics based on the balance of power, and applies it.

Chapter 1 – Laws and Theories
Laws establish relations between variables. They are of the form: “if a then b with probability x.” Theories are collections of laws pertaining to a particular behavior or phenomenon – they explain laws and are not obvious from laws. You can’t just get the answer by looking at all of the data. Statistics don’t explain why things are related – that’s why we need theories.

Chapter 2 – Reductionist Theories
Theories can be reductionist or systemic. Reductionist theories concentrate causes at the individual or national level. They assume the whole can be understood by understanding all of its parts. Systemic theories conceive of causes operating at the international level. They believe that internal explanations alone cannot explain how states choose to act – external conditions matter.

Waltz describes some existing reductionist theories, including those that attempt to relate imperialism, capitalism, and war. However, he believes these do not adequately explain past events or predict future ones. Theories are manipulated by broadening the meaning of definitions to fit new events or by making exceptions based on variables outside the theory. He concludes that reductionist theories have failed so far in explaining international politics.

Chapter 3 - Systemic Approaches and Theories
Systems-level forces seem to be at work in international politics – outcomes are affected not only by the properties and interconnections of variables, but also the way they are organized. Some existing system theories are not theories because they just organize thoughts and don’t explain them, or because they incorporate non-system-level items, such as internal characteristics of states. He argues that the current balance of power theory does not adequately describe international politics – it has loose language and is not clear when different types of power distributions take place.

Chapter 4 – Reductionist and Systemic Theories
This chapter includes more discussion of defects of current reductionist and systemic theories – generally that they don’t have explanatory power, or they allow too many details into the discussion – allowing exceptions to be made. Often they are organizations of thoughts – structures for thinking – rather than theories.

Chapter 5 – Political Structures
Waltz showed previously that international political outcomes cannot be explained reductively, and that current systemic approaches confuse system-level and unit-level causes. International politics must be a domain separate from social, economic, and other domains. Domestic political structure is defined by three things: 1) the principle by which it is ordered, 2) the specifications of the functions formally differentiated units, and 3) by the distribution of capabilities across those units. He gives the example of how character of the prime minister is different than the character of the president because of the different systems in the U.S. and U.K. The president is elected as an individual, but has less power once in his position. The Prime Minister has a lot of power, but comes to power based on moving up slowly through the ranks of government and generally being a person known for compromise that keeps the party united.

In a systemic theory of international politics, states are the relevant units – the international system is decentralized and anarchic. States are not differentiated by the functions they perform – they are like units (similar to markets being defined in terms of firms – international political structure in terms of states). The units of such an order are distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks.

Chapter 6 – Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power
Waltz first explains how hierarchic and anarchic orders are different. In hierarchic orders (within states) government has monopoly over legitimate force, while in anarchic orders, states are in a self-help system. Within states, groups can specialize and benefit from trade. Among states, nations wish to remain loosely connected and not overly dependent on other states. Also, within a global system, each state, acting in their own interest, can lead to outcomes that none wanted – similar to a run on the bank in economics.

Balance of power theory is a theory about the results produced by the uncoordinated actions of states. Assumptions are made about the interests and motives of states (it does not explain them). It explains the constraints that confine all states. Balance-of-power theory can explain why a certain similarity of behavior is expected from similarly situated states.  The theory leads us to suspect that states behave in ways that result in balances forming. (This is in contrast to behavior such as band-wagoning – all jumping to the winners side.) It predicts that states will engage in balancing behavior, whether or not balancing is the end of their acts. The theory predicts a strong tendency of balance in the system – not that balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another. Suggests that states will be competitive and will imitate each other to become more successful.

Chapter 7 – Structural Causes and Economic Effects
Capabilities of states depend on how they score on size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capabilities, military strength, political stability, and competence. Though there may be many states in the international system, international politics can be understood simply by studying the most prominent. (Similar to the study of oligopolistic systems in economics, in which industries with many firms can still be best understood by looking at most prominent of them.)

In this chapter, Waltz shows that smaller number of prominent states in the system is better – systems are most stable when barriers to entry are high (fewer, bigger firms). The costs of bargaining are lower with less units involved – less diversity in participants makes reaching agreements easier, and members have a greater stake in the system and more incentive to invest in enforcing agreements.

The idea that the world is becoming more interdependent and that this leads to peace is a myth. Interdependence should be understood as sensitivity to other states or vulnerability to other states – asking whether they are actually dependent on each other, rather than just one being dependent on the other. Interdependence actually decreases as the number of states decrease – large, powerful states are more self-sufficient.

Chapter 8 – Structural Causes and Military Effects
A two-state system will be the most stable. With only two powers acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them – no unexpected events coming from an ignored region. With only two powers, miscalculation is less likely. Nuclear forces should not be discounted just because states don’t use them – the fact that violence does not need to be used shows that they are able to protect their interests in other ways.

Chapter 9 – The Management of International Affairs 
Power does not bring control over the international system, but it does four things: 1) Power provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of force that other wield. 2) Greater power permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcomes of action uncertain. 3) The powerful enjoy wider margins of safety in dealing with the less powerful and have more to say about what games will be played and how. 4) Great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake. In a bipolar world, there will be more effort at management of the system.

Back in DC... and back to school

I've been back in DC for a little over a week now, and I definitely hit the ground running as far as school, work, and wedding planning. I've had a bit of jet lag, but it makes me want to wake up earlier in the morning, which I usually hate to do - so the main side effect is that it's easier to get to work in the morning... not bad.

So I thought I'd do a series of update posts on what's going on in school, work, and wedding planning. (This one is about school.)

For school, I have three main activities: a Dynamic Modeling Course, preparing my Prospectus (the paper that defends the idea for my dissertation), and reading a long list of International Security and Economic Policy (ISEP) books and articles for my (last!) comprehensive exam.

The Dynamic Modeling course is going well, too. I have lectures Thursdays fro 1:30-4pm, and during each class the professor basically walks us through the process of building one or more models - he uses the Stella modeling program on his computer, projected onto the board. That way, we get a sense of the capabilities of the modeling software. Then we have a weekly homework that is basically to build another model on our own that uses the same functionality - it usually takes me an hour or less to do that. It's generally pretty interesting stuff, though I think it's less relevant to my dissertation than I was originally hoping. This week we have a midterm, so instead of going in to class, the professor is going to email us requirements for a specific model to build, and building it will be the test. The other major item for the class is the final project - which is a model you build related to whatever topic you're interested in to help you answer a specific question - something like modeling likely future emissions levels under various conditions - things like that.

Writing the prospectus has been going pretty well - I wrote a short outline/ draft that I sent to my two advisors for feedback. I'm hoping they can let me know if I'm on the right track, and then I can elaborate on what I already have. I think I have a pretty good idea of what I want to do for my dissertation - basically, I'm looking into why there hasn't been more international cooperation in monitoring climate change via satellite, despite numerous international efforts. There are a lot of variables that have been deemed essential, but are not being collected, and there are others that many different countries are all collecting. I'm particularly excited, because I found a database that should allow me to have some analytical aspect to my research - actually running a few regressions to say statistically what matters. I also met with some experts at the Climate Change and Satellite Center at Maryland. They mostly do technical research, but the director of the program is involved in the national and international political efforts to some extent. They gave me a lot of good information, but the main thing I was happy about was the fact that they liked the premise of my thesis, and thought it was a reasonable question to look into.

The last thing is reading all of those books and papers for my final comprehensive exam. This is a tough one, because it's just so time consuming, and there's no way around it. I'm basically up to date on the books I need to read, though I'm a little behind in journals. I'm hoping to write summaries of the things I've read and put them on the blog (like I did with past comps). I figure if I don't write a summary, I don't remember it that well a few months from now, and then what was the point of spending all those hours reading? So hopefully you'll start seeing summaries soon. (Right now I'm reading 'After Hegemony' by Robert Keohane.)